Drug Crimes

Massachusetts Residents Face Charges of Drug Trafficking as a Result of a Boston-Area Drug Sweep

Published on: July 16, 2012 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

On Monday July 9, 2012 a combined effort by Boston police officers and FBI agents dismantled an alleged illegal drug ring, arresting fourteen people spanning twelve locations across Boston, Milton, and Canton. The Boston Globe reports that the enterprise was brought to an end as a result of the largest drug investigation to hit Boston in at least a decade. The investigation, nicknamed Operation Rodeo, lasted thirteen months and involved agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Department of Homeland Security; Internal Revenue Service; and the Boston Police Department. The federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, formed to combat drug activity in and around Boston, purportedly collected thousands of hours of physical surveillance, forensic accounting, translation services, GPS tracking, confidential sources, and a supposed “tremendous” amount of electronic surveillance. Suffolk County District Attorney Daniel F. Conley said that eleven people have been arrested and charged with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, as a result of those warrants and seizures. With three more people having been charged with related gun and drug offenses and additional complaints to follow, the police believe that cocaine trafficking business has taken a brutal blow.

The law enforcement authorities claim that the alleged trafficking operation was headed by Juan “White Boy” Guzman, formerly of Hyde Park, who is currently serving a jail sentence for gun and drug convictions. Guzman and his associates have allegedly been trafficking shipments of as much as 40 kilograms of cocaine at a time from Mexico to Boston. Authorities handling Operation Rodeo have seized assets including $500,000, four vehicles, nine bank accounts, and a safetydeposit box allegedly used by the drug ring. Some of those involved are said to also be under investigation for crimes of violence, murder, assault, and in particular, a 2010 triple-homicide at a Centre Street pizzeria in Jamaica Plain. Aside from Guzman, Numitor Vallejo, 31; ; Thomas Lugo, Jr., 25; Caesar Aguasvivas, 32; and Jonathan Tejeda, 30. were arrested in relation to the cocaine trafficking, and Manuel Martinez, 24, faces gun and assault charges stemming from his involvement in the organization. Not guilty pleas have been entered for all individuals charged and all are presumed innocent of any crime alleged.

The crime of conspiracy to traffic cocaine is a felony in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and is punishable by up to 15 years in state prison and/or a fine of up to $25,000. In recent decades, the trafficking of drugs has become a worldwide phenomenon, as drugs remain a major commodity in the global black market. Drug trafficking involves the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of controlled substances and is prosecuted vigorously by State and Federal authorities, as the US attempts to make headway on its ‘War On Drugs’ campaign. Law enforcement officials remain concerned because they believe that the business of drug trafficking is usually surrounded with other violent crimes, including murder, human trafficking, slavery, racketeering, and extortion. Cocaine is the most lucrative of these illegal drugs. The United Nations estimates that sales of the drug net $88 billion a year in the retail market alone. Unfortunately, cocaine trafficking and abuse continue to threaten the health and safety of American citizens.
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Warrantless Massachusetts Cell Phone Search Case to be Decided by SJC

Published on: May 25, 2012 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

The Law Office of Patrick J. Murphy has succeeded in convincing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for Suffolk County to allow an interlocutory appeal to review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized from a defendant through an unlawful and warrantless search of a cell phone. The case originated from the Boston Municipal Court, East Boston Division. The SJC Docket No. is SJ-2012-0144.

At issue is whether the police acted improperly by searching the defendant’s cellular telephone without a search warrant after seizing it pursuant to a lawful arrest while the defendant was in custody back at the police station. Although the lower court denied the motion to suppress of the alleged cell phone evidence that the police said tied the defendant to the crime, in his decision, the judge at the motion hearing recognized that neither the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts nor the Massachusetts Appeals Court have addressed the issue of a warrantless search of a cell phone after the defendant is in custody.

Unfortunately, there is conflicting case law among the federal circuits. Attorney Patrick Murphy is urging the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to uphold the protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to require that the police show deference to the warrant requirement before such a search should take place.
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The “CSI Effect” in Massachusetts Criminal Cases: What Potential Jurors Can Now Be Asked

Published on: September 24, 2011 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Many prosecutors in Massachusetts believe that potential jurors who watch crime television programs like CSI are prone to wrongfully acquit otherwise guilty defendants when little or no scientific evidence has been presented by them in a criminal case. Massachusetts prosecutors claim that this result which has been called the “CSI effect”, can be traced to the CSI television series and other similar shows. However, there is no solid evidence that the CSI effect actually exists. The complaints about the CSI effect, usually in the form of prosecutor interviews after trial or some media stories, do not amount to solid empirical evidence on the issue. A skilled Massachusetts criminal defense attorney will take advantage of the fact that certain scientific tests were not performed on evidence and arguments and inferences can be made from the lack of scientific testing. Jury instructions will also be requested by the defense regarding the lack of investigation and testing.

Yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the CSI effect by deciding that potential jurors can now be questioned by prosecutors before they are seated for trial about whether or not they would require indisputable scientific proof in order to find someone guilty of a crime. In upholding the conviction of a defendant charged with murder in a 2003 homicide case, the court rejected the defense argument that the prosecutor’s CSI-related questions prejudiced the jury by suggesting that they should ignore a lack of scientific proof. The defense claimed that such questioning results in dismissing potential jurors that would require more scientific evidence in case. The court stated that the questions, when tailored properly, can ensure that jurors on a given case are able to decide guilt or innocence without any bias. The court also stated that the questions did not favor the prosecution by selecting jurors who were likely to convict a defendant with limited or circumstantial evidence presented by the state.
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Drunk Driving and Roadside Field Sobriety Testing in Massachusetts OUI Cases

Published on: September 1, 2011 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

This article will discuss the different types of standard field sobriety tests that are currently being used by law enforcement officials in Massachusetts for people suspected of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI/DWI), commonly referred to as drunk driving. The tests used by police officers out in the field in traffic stops consist mainly of the walk-and-turn test, the one-leg stand test, alcohol breath test, and horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The results of these tests are used because government officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration learned decades ago that they have been reliable indicators for distinguishing blood alcohol content beyond the legal limit for driving, assuming that the tests were administered in a standardized manner by a properly trained police officer.

The walk-and-turn test is divided up into two areas. First, there is an instruction phase where the individual detained is told to keep the arms at his or her side, and to put his or her feet heel to toe. The person is then instructed to listen to the directions as the officer informs them to take nine heal to toe steps, turn in a certain manner, then take another nine heal to toe steps back. The second phase is the physical test itself. Scoring by the officer is performed based upon certain cues including but not limited to whether the person lost balance, started too soon, stopped while walking, and touched heal to toe, etc. During this time the officer is looking for two or more cues which would lead to the probability that they where operating their motor vehicle while intoxicated.

The one-leg stand is a test that also has an instructional part then a balancing and counting part. During the instructional part, the police officer asks the person to stand with feet together, arms at the side and to listen. The person is told to raise one leg about six inches off the ground with toes pointed outward while keeping both legs straight. The person is then instructed to count out loud until told to stop. During this time, the person must follow the instructions as given by the officer. There are four specific cues that the officer looks for during this test: any swaying while balancing, using the arms to balance, hopping, or putting a foot down during the test. If you put your foot down three or more times during the thirty-second period the police consider you unable to complete the test. If you have two or more cues you also fail the test.
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The Constitutionality of Strip Searches in Massachusetts

Published on: August 24, 2011 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

The United States Supreme Court will decide in its upcoming term the issue of whether or not a person entering a jail has a right to be free from strip search absent additional facts or individualized reasonable suspicion justifying the search. The Supreme Court has already held that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches applies to strip searches and it held that there must be a greater justification from officials for strip searches than less intrusive searches. In Safford v. Redding, the Supreme Court held that public school officials violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a young teenager while at school when they searched her for drugs and subjected her to a strip search without any facts suggesting that drugs were hidden under her clothing.

This begs the question in a case where a defendant has been arrested by police in Massachusetts: What is the current law here and does it afford greater individual protections than what the United States Supreme Court has already recognized under the Fourth Amendment? In Massachusetts, searches and seizures of individuals by the police may be conducted at the time of an arrest or at a later point when the defendant arrives a the place of detention. However, for a strip search to be constitutionally permissible, the police must have probable cause to believe that the individual possesses concealed illegal contraband on his person or under clothing that would not be discovered by a routine pat down frisk that is usually performed upon an arrest. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 409 (1999). What is probable cause? Probable cause is said to have been met when the facts and circumstances within the police officers knowledge and which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” See Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 174 (1982)

Therefore, the law in Massachusetts requires that there be probable cause to believe that the items sought by the police are actually related to the criminal activity that they are investigating and they can be reasonably expected to be found in the place searched based upon the known facts and circumstances at the time. See Commonwealth v. Truax, 397 Mass. 174, 178 (1986). The Massachusetts standard applying the probable cause analysis to strip searches and visual body cavity searches is greater than the Supreme Court Fourth Amendment analysis, which requires only that police have “reasonable suspicion” before conducting these intrusive searches.
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Citizen Tipster Helps Police with Gun and Drug Arrests in Boston, Massachusetts

Published on: August 10, 2011 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Two Boston men were caught by police after a citizen tipped-off investigators. As a result of the tip, police recovered a handgun and crack cocaine when they arrested the pair on Monday, August 8, 2011 as reported in the Boston Herald. Both men pleaded not guilty to firearm and drug charges but were held on bail of $25,000-$30,000.

How will their lawyers likely handle defending them? One area that an aggressive and relentless Boston, Massachusetts criminal defense attorney must vigorously explore in this case is the nature of the tip from the informant, in this case, a citizen as indicated by the Boston Police. In the criminal law area of stop and search or frisk, the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge prongs must be applied to the tip information. This information must be determined to justify the use of the tip by police to make a stop and/or seizure of evidence by police. If the proper protocols are not followed the lawyer may be able to suppress any evidence from the stop.

How did the tipster, a citizen, learn what he or she claimed to know? Was there any personal observation made by the tipster? What is the tipster’s veracity? In other words, was the tipster credible and worthy of belief under the circumstances with the information provided? Is the citizen providing the tip named or unnamed? Where the identity of an unnamed citizen is not revealed, that person actually is an anonymous informant and different rules apply. Anyone can call the police and make up an accusation. Where the identity of a concerned citizen in not provided to police, the citizen is an unknown informant and his or her reliability must be shown.The reliability of that citizen must be demonstrated by the prosecution an a hearing on the motion to suppress. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 403. Mass. 483, 485 (1988).
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Criminal Law Defense of Entrapment in Massachusetts

Published on: June 23, 2011 | by Patrick J. Murphy, Esq.

Entrapment has been defined as the act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. According to the generally accepted view, a law enforcement official, or an undercover agent acting in cooperation with such an official, perpetrates an entrapment when, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime, he originates the idea of the crime and then induces another person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do so. Sorrells v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413.

In order to use the entrapment defense in Massachusetts, some evidence of inducement that goes beyond a mere solicitation by a police officer or government agent must be presented at the criminal trial by the defense. Entrapment is a defense to be raised only at trial and is not presented by way of pretrial motion to dismiss. Once raised properly, the burden is then on the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was initially predisposed to commit the crime and was therefore “ready and willing to commit the crime whenever the opportunity might be afforded.” Commonwealth_v_Doyle_67_Mass_App_Ct_846_2006.

If the defendant on trial has a prior criminal history of distribution of drugs or possession with intent to distribute drugs then that history can be used by the prosecution to show that the person was already predisposed to commit the offense and thereby negate the defense of entrapment. See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 417 Mass. 792, 632 N.E.2d 1223 (1994).
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