In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the protections of the Second Amendment, which guarantees the right to bear arms. Traditionally, this amendment was most often associated with firearms, but these protections have extended beyond guns. In a significant development, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently addressed a case that challenged a long-standing law prohibiting the possession of switchblade knives. This case highlights how the interpretation of the Second Amendment continues to evolve, potentially affecting how Massachusetts law views other weapons.

The case began when a man was arrested following an altercation with his girlfriend in Boston. Police were called to the scene and, during a search incident to arrest, discovered a switchblade knife on the defendant. Under Massachusetts law, possession of such a knife was illegal, and he was charged with carrying a dangerous weapon. However, rather than simply accepting the charge, the defendant decided to challenge the constitutionality of the law itself. His legal team argued that the law banning switchblades violated his Second Amendment rights, especially in light of recent Supreme Court rulings.

The argument hinged on whether a switchblade knife could be considered an “arm” protected under the Second Amendment. While the common understanding of the Second Amendment has long focused on firearms, recent rulings by the Supreme Court have broadened this definition to include other bearable arms, emphasizing the inherent right of self-defense. The defendant’s position was that switchblades, which are a type of folding knife, have been used historically for lawful purposes, including self-defense, and should be included within the scope of the Second Amendment.

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As technology and society continue to evolve, new types of crimes can emerge, often targeting individuals in ways that were unimaginable just a few years ago. One such crime is known as revenge porn. This involves the sharing or threatening to share explicit images of someone, typically obtained consensually in a private context, with the intent to harm, shame, or coerce the person involved. While the distribution of such material is done without consent, its emotional and psychological impact can be devastating. Recognizing the gravity of this issue, the Massachusetts General Assembly recently passed laws criminalizing revenge porn, which were signed into law earlier this year.

These new laws have two major effects. First, they criminalize the non-consensual sharing of sexually explicit images, closing a long-standing legal loophole that left many victims without legal recourse. Revenge porn, once merely a morally reprehensible act, is now considered a serious criminal offense under Massachusetts law. Second, the law expands the definition of domestic violence to encompass a broader range of abusive behaviors, known as coercive control. This includes non-physical acts such as intimidation, isolation, or threats, which are intended to manipulate or dominate a partner or family member. The law is detailed in its description of what constitutes coercive control, which can include anything from depriving a person of their basic needs to threatening harm to a child, pet, or family member. The scope of the law suggests it can be enforced in ways that are not yet fully foreseeable, and individuals may find themselves facing criminal charges under this broader definition.

When new laws like this are enacted, prosecutors often test the boundaries and limits of their enforcement. In many cases, these laws can be applied in overly aggressive ways, leading to prosecutions that may not have been anticipated when the law was drafted. Over time, some aspects of these laws may be found to be over broad or misapplied, but in the meantime, defendants may find themselves facing severe penalties. Those charged with domestic violence under the expanded definition of coercive control, or with the new crime of revenge porn, should take immediate action to protect their rights. Developing a strong legal strategy from the outset is crucial, especially when dealing with new and evolving legal theories. Anyone facing charges related to these crimes should seek the advice of a Massachusetts criminal defense attorney who is up to date on these laws and can navigate their complexities to prevent over prosecution.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a vital protection against unlawful searches and seizures. It ensures that evidence obtained without a valid warrant cannot be used against defendants in court. However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, and law enforcement officers, along with prosecutors, often seek to leverage these exceptions to justify warrantless searches. A recent decision by the Massachusetts Appeals Court highlights the complexities surrounding these issues in cases where crucial evidence is obtained without a warrant.

In a recent case, a defendant was charged with second-degree murder after a tragic incident occurred in a Boston housing development. Surveillance cameras captured the shooting, and an eyewitness described the events. The police identified the defendant as a suspect several days later, based on the eyewitness’s independent investigation. More than three months after the incident, law enforcement tracked down the defendant and arrested him without obtaining a warrant. At the time of the arrest, the defendant was seen carrying a backpack, which was later found to contain a firearm. The defendant’s legal team argued that the warrantless search of the backpack, conducted after the arrest, was unconstitutional and that the evidence should be suppressed.

The trial court heard arguments on the motion to suppress the firearm and other evidence obtained from the backpack. The court concluded that while the search could not be justified as a search incident to the defendant’s arrest, the seizure of the backpack was reasonable. The judge found that because the backpack had been on the defendant’s person immediately before his arrest, it was permissible for the officers to seize it. Despite finding the immediate search unjustified, the judge ruled that the firearm should not be suppressed, as it would have inevitably been discovered during a lawful inventory search at the police station.

In Massachusetts criminal trials, evidence presented by the state must be relevant to the case, but not all relevant evidence is automatically admissible. The court must weigh whether the evidence’s probative value—its ability to prove something important—is greater than its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. Certain evidence does not have enough probative value to counteract the risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant, so the Rules of Evidence may prohibit its admission.

A recent appellate decision involved a defendant convicted of domestic violence. The prosecution had evidence of other uncharged violent acts by the defendant against the victim, which they argued was relevant to show the defendant’s intent and the hostile nature of the relationship. The defendant objected, claiming this evidence would unfairly bias the jury against him. The trial court decided to exclude some of this evidence while allowing other parts in. The jury, after hearing the admitted evidence, convicted the defendant, who then appealed the decision, arguing that the inclusion of the prior bad acts was prejudicial and should have been excluded entirely.

In Massachusetts, the rules regarding the admission of prior bad acts are specific. Such evidence can be allowed if it helps demonstrate a common pattern, intent, or absence of mistake, but it must be carefully weighed against the potential for undue prejudice. In this case, the trial judge provided instructions to the jury to limit the impact of the prior bad acts evidence, emphasizing that it should not be used to infer the defendant’s bad character but rather to consider specific aspects like intent or motive. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision, noting that the instructions were clear and effective in mitigating any potential prejudice. They further noted that the jury’s ability to acquit the defendant of some charges indicated they were not unduly swayed by the prior bad acts evidence.

In Massachusetts, prosecutors bear the significant responsibility of proving that any evidence used against a defendant is admissible before it can be presented to a jury. This process ensures that the rights of the accused are protected and that the integrity of the judicial process is maintained. Generally, evidence obtained illegally is not admissible in court, but there are instances where such evidence can still be considered. Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed an appeal by a defendant who argued that the evidence used against him was gathered following an illegal stop by the police. Despite the initial illegality, the evidence was ultimately deemed admissible.

In the case in question, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained after he was stopped by police, arguing that the stop was unlawful. Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, agreeing that the evidence should be suppressed. However, upon reconsideration, the court reversed its decision, finding that despite the illegal stop, the subsequent actions by the police and the nature of the evidence justified its admission. The defendant then appealed this decision, seeking to have the higher court re-evaluate the lower court’s ruling.

The Appeals Court undertook a thorough review of the case, focusing on the standards that must be met for evidence obtained after an illegal stop to be admissible. One of the key considerations was whether the connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently attenuated, meaning that the evidence could be considered independently of the initial illegality. The court evaluated several factors, including the passage of time between the illegal stop and the gathering of evidence, the presence of any intervening circumstances, and the degree of police misconduct.

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In today’s rapidly advancing technological landscape, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors have access to a growing array of tools and methods to investigate and gather evidence. With the advent of artificial intelligence and sophisticated data analytics, traditional methods of crime-solving are being supplemented and often surpassed by new digital techniques. However, as technology progresses, legal protections against search and seizure sometimes struggle to keep pace. Courts are continually called upon to interpret and establish what types of warrants and legal processes are required to obtain different forms of digital evidence. Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed these issues in an appeal where the defendant argued that his location and cell phone ping data were unlawfully obtained and used to convict him.

The case in question was filed after an apparent murder in 2012. On that day, the defendant allegedly shot and killed a woman in her car in Fall River, Massachusetts. The victim’s body was discovered in her vehicle, with evidence of a robbery gone wrong. She had been carrying drugs, which were found both on her person and beneath her body. The victim’s cell phone was notably missing from the scene, setting the stage for the digital trail that would later play a crucial role in the investigation.

To track down the defendant, police relied heavily on data from the victim’s phone. The call logs revealed a phone number linked to the defendant, indicating that he had been in contact with the victim shortly before her death. The defendant, identified through his call history, was found to have made a call to the victim just before the shooting. Through further investigation, including witness statements and physical evidence such as a bloodstained T-shirt and a handgun found in the defendant’s possession, the case against him began to build. The defendant filed motions to suppress the cell phone records and related data, arguing they were obtained without a proper warrant, but these motions were denied. Ultimately, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based on the theory of felony murder, with armed robbery as the underlying felony.

In today’s digital age, technology has revolutionized countless aspects of our lives, including the ways in which the legal system in Massachusetts addresses public indecency and related offenses. Surveillance cameras, smartphones, and social media have made it easier than ever for law enforcement and prosecutors to monitor and prosecute behavior that was once private. However, this rapid technological advancement often outpaces the evolution of the legal statutes intended to regulate such behavior, resulting in complex legal challenges for those accused of crimes.

Recently, a case brought before the Massachusetts Court of Appeals highlighted a significant legal question: can a person’s behavior be considered “open” for the purposes of a lewdness statute if it was captured on a surveillance camera rather than witnessed in person? This case centered on a defendant accused of masturbating in front of a camera inside a client’s home. The prosecution sought to apply an old statute designed to address in-person conduct to this new, virtual situation. The central issue was whether the defendant’s actions could be deemed “open” under the law, given that they were only seen on recorded footage rather than observed live.

According to the facts discussed in the recently published opinion, The defendant was a painter hired to work in the victim’s home, and he was accused of masturbating in various rooms while looking into the surveillance cameras installed by the victim. The cameras were not monitored in real-time but recorded the events for later viewing. The prosecution argued that because the defendant was aware of the cameras, his behavior should be considered “open” lewdness as defined under Massachusetts General Laws. Essentially, they contended that the presence of cameras implied that the defendant’s conduct was “public” enough to warrant charges.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement, which can include unlawful arrests or detainments. In the event of an unlawful search or seizure, the law mandates that any evidence obtained illegally cannot be used in the prosecution. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals recently heard a case that challenged the suppression of evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution.

According to the facts discussed in the appellate opinion, the Defendant was stopped by police under suspicion of involvement in a drug transaction. The defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the stop, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. After an evidentiary hearing, a District Court judge ruled in favor of the defendant, suppressing the evidence. However, the Commonwealth appealed the decision, leading to a reversal by the Supreme Judicial Court.

The background of the case provides context for understanding the court’s decision. A police detective, with extensive experience in narcotics cases, conducted surveillance in a parking lot known for drug activity. The detective observed the defendant engaging in what he believed to be a drug transaction based on specific behaviors and contextual factors. Despite not witnessing an actual exchange of items, the detective’s observations, combined with information from a fellow officer regarding the defendant’s reputation as a drug dealer, led him to suspect criminal activity.

Anyone accused of a crime in Massachusetts may have several opportunities to challenge the accusations lodged against them. Sometimes, charges are dismissed based on evidentiary issues before a trial occurs. At the close of a trial, defendants may be successful in asking the court to acquit them without sending the charges to a jury. After a conviction, defendants may be entitled to relief by an appeal if an error was made below. In situations where a defendant’s trial counsel made mistakes that resulted in a conviction, defendants may be entitled to relief by making a claim on appeal of “ineffective assistance of counsel.” Although it is a high bar to meet, it is possible for someone to be completely exonerated by way of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently addressed a defendant’s claim that their counsel was ineffective by failing to request a new trial before they were convicted of a violent assault crime.

According to the facts discussed in the recently published opinion, the defendant was charged with assault after she was found by a family member next to an unconscious man in an apartment. After the defendant was confronted by the man’s friends, other individuals intervened and allowed her to escape. Later, the alleged victim found a wallet that appeared to belong to the assailant, and she was tracked down and arrested. The defendant was later convicted at trial, although she took issue with her defense counsel’s performance and appealed the conviction to the state appeals court.

On appeal, the defendant’s motion for a new trial and claim of ineffective assistance of counsel were denied. She argued that her lawyer failed to inform her about the possibility of a Continuance Without a Finding (CWOF). However, a new trial can only be granted if justice likely was not served, and such motions are granted only in exceptional circumstances. The trial judge, who also ruled on the motion, found no evidence of ineffective assistance. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show their lawyer’s performance was significantly below standard and likely deprived them of a substantial defense.

In the world of legal dramas as known by pop culture, we’ve all witnessed those intense courtroom scenes where a victim or witness dramatically points to the defendant, solidifying their guilt in the eyes of the jury. However, what these shows and movies often fail to depict is the complexity and unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Contrary to popular belief, these identifications aren’t the infallible evidence they’re often portrayed to be. In reality, they can be influenced by many of factors, leading to potentially flawed convictions.

Massachusetts law recognizes the inherent pitfalls of eyewitness identifications and imposes strict guidelines regarding their admissibility in court. Controlling legal precedents underscore the importance of these safeguards, as demonstrated by a recent case where a man’s attempted murder conviction was overturned due to an improper in-court identification that may have wrongly influenced the jury in his case.

According to the facts discussed in the appellate opinion, the defendant was arrested and charged with felony assault and attempted murder after he was identified by witnesses as the person who returned to a party and shot at a home where the alleged victim was injured by gunfire. The witness identified the defendant as the shooter while being interviewed by the police, and then testified in court that the defendant was the person she saw committing the crime. The defendant was convicted of the charges at trial, but appealed the court’s allowance for the witness to identify the defendant in a dramatic in-court fashion.

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